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CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: IS
TAKING RITES SERIOUSLY A
FANTASY, FOLLY, OR FAILURE?
Steven D. Pepe*
Now that clinical legal education programs are midway into
their second decade of development, a number of forces call into
question the future of this experiment. A changed social context,
. declining law school enrollments, and general economic constraints on universities may again prove that "[i]nnovation in legal education comes hard, is limited in scope and permission,
and generally dies young." 1
Clinical programs were the outgrowth of several forces in the
sixties. The war in Vietnam, racial explosions in the ghettos, and
the growing visibility of unjustified economic, social, and sexual
inequality caused a stirring from which law schools were not exempt. Law students began questioning the relevance of their
courses that aimed primarily toward the service of the existing
social and economic order and ignored the most pressing
problems of the day. Many students wanted legal careers more
directly linked to their values and idealism.
A ten million dollar grant from the Ford Foundation to the
Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility provided the economic base that, when merged with the student
discontent in law schools, would make possible the initial development of clinic programs. While limited follow-up funding
from the Department of Education continues, clinics today are
more dependent for their continuance on private foundation
grants and law school budgets. Many faculties, concerned with
shrinking law school budgets and growing gaps between the salary levels of practitioners and law professors, are asking whether
the unsubsidized costs of clinical programs are worth the benefits clinics provide. This questioning occurs at a time when
clinical programs have demonstrated their educational worth to
the satisfaction of most law school faculties. Fieldwork clinics'
• Magistrate, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan and
Adjunct Lecturer, University of Michigan Law School. A.B., 1965, University of Notre
Drune; J.D., 1968, University of Michigan; LL.M., 1972, Harvard University.
1. R. REDMOUNT & T. SHAFFER, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 21, 24 (1977).
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growth period has ended. Now that clinicians and others have
developed respectable simulation teaching methods, simulation
courses prove more attractive to satisfy the pressures for more
practical offerings than the more expensive fieldwork clinical
models.
A glut of law graduates in a leveling legal market creates student concern about finding an entry level job. Student enthusiasm for legal services for society's disadvantaged has faded.
Some students worry. that experience in a clinical course in a
legal services setting raises suspicions in large firms about their
priorities and career interests. Students also consider that
clinical programs, even absent any "poverty law taint," are less
marketable in resumes and their accompanying transcript~ than
safer traditional law school offerings. When these factors are
combined with the voting strength of clinicians and their allies
on most faculties, the future of clinical fieldwork courses appears
problematic.
This article assesses the primary product of law schools-the
practicing lawyer-and reviews the criticisms of the adequacy of
the initial training for attorneys that law schools provide. After
a brief. review of goals of legal education and goals of clinical
teaching methods, the article argues that properly structured
clinical programs are not based on flawed premises and that the
nation's law schools, particularly the leading schools, should not
abandon their clinical experiments without further efforts to
help clinical legal education achieve its unfulfilled promises. The
premises and assertions of this article are not new. Indeed, they
are reiterations of a controversy that has been ongoing, with varying degrees of intensity, for over a half century.
I.

THE LEGAL PRACTITIONER

Nearly ninety percent of the graduates of Michigan Law
School practice law in some form. A total of less than five percent enter either teaching, the legislative, or executive branches
of goverments. 2 An analysis of the various elements that define
an attorney highlights those elements of a lawyer's skills to
which law schools can make their most effective contributions. A
2. Adams & Chambers, The Recent Alumni of the University of Michigan Law
School: A Report on a Survey of the Classes of 1966 and 1967 Fifteen Years After Graduation and the Classes of 1976 and 1977 Five Years After Graduation 26 (1984) (on file
with u. MICH. J.L. REF.).
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simplified scheme can serve as a heuristic model. The scheme
conceives of a lawyer as a series of overlapping collections of experience, knowledge, and beliefs that could be grouped in the
following categories of legal doctrine, institutional understanding, skills, professional role, and personal identity.
A.

Legal Doctrine

Lawyers differ from other individuals because of their specialized knowledge of substantive and procedural rules, including
both the specific rules and the general policies, norms, and
processes that compose our legal universe. The ideas in this collection of specialized knowledge provide the primary focal points
of legal educators and bar examiners.

B. Institutional Understanding
Legal doctrine is institutionally based. Attorneys cannot usefully apply legal doctrine for clients without acquiring a vast
knowledge about the interpersonal and institutional elements of
the settings in which their clients operate. This knowledge commonly affects outcomes more than does legal doctrine. Lawyers
learn about the structure, reward system, access and leverage
points of courts, probation departments, law enforcement agencies, social service departments, corporations, insurance companies, trade or labor unions, legislatures, and law firms. Effective
service to clients requires coping, persuading, bargaining,
manipulating, or avoiding maneuvers in various institutional
transactions. Commonly, legal doctrines affect modes of persuasion, bargaining, and the relative power of the parties. Other factors such as personality, bias, status, power, money, and a certain degree of fortune also affect outcome. In such transactions,
legal doctrine may have little relevance if other dynamics are
mishandled.
The legal realists noted that the law could not be understood
apart from these institutional and interpersonal elements. Such
an understanding gives legal doctrine a more humble, but more
accurate, meaning. Law schools have begun to focus more attention on this interplay of legal theory and institutions. Yet, cognitive classroom studies can teach only a limited amount about
these extralegal factors. A fuller comprehension of such elements
and their interactions develops only in the world of experience
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and practice.

C.

Skills

Many discussions about clinical legal education suggest that
traditional law school pedagogy is theoretical and that clinical
programs develop practical skills. The truth is that law schools
have always focused on skills training. The skills, however, are
the skills of legal analysis, analogic thinking, and persuasive argument. Such skills are central to legal practice, but their usefulness to law professors does not make them any the less skills.
No one argues that training in these traditional law school skills
is inappropriate for law school education merely because they
are also practice skills. Nor is there the assumption that they are
skills that cannot be taught. While the vehicle used to teach
these skills-legal doctrine-is theoretical, the pedagogical
method of teaching them is not theoretical. Rather, like many
skills, they are taught by teacher modeling and student drill
within the classroom dialogue. The legal academy deems this
skills training one of its greatest achievements, teaching novitiates how to think like lawyers.
Other skills are necessary for novitiates to think and act like
lawyers. These include the skills involved in interviewing, counseling, decision making, problem solving, case planning, advocacy, and bargaining. While the methods used to teach these
skills may differ, and law faculty members may have lesser inclination, talent, or experience to train in these skills, the skills are
no less amenable to modeling and drill than the legal analysis
exercises that occur in law schools. Nor are these skills any less
appropriate for law school training than legal reasoning skills.
Each of them is subject to thoughtful analysis about theories of
effectiveness and, like legal reasoning and argument, each of
these skills has a cognitive element and a· performance element
capable of being evaluated and improved.

D.

Professional Role

In addition to the doctrinal base, institutional understanding,
and practice skills, lawyers assume a professional role comprised
of behavioral and dispositional expectancies. Professional codes
of conduct define many of these expectancies through minimum
requirements for competency, diligence, and concern for client,
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accompanied by limits on exploitation of client and opponent,
adversarial conduct, business activities, and misuse of office. In
addition, lawyers are socialized in the informal rules, customs,
and procedures of the tribunals and agencies before which they
practice. The professional role creates performance demands as
well as a set of permissions and privileges that facilitate lawyers'
work. All these factors define the lawyer's public self.

E.

Personal Identity

There is another part of all attorneys-the private self-those
meanings and values that define the person. The private self
chooses relationships and degrees of responsibility to others and
society. From one's identity flow philosophical and political beliefs, the capacities for creativity and aesthetic appreciation, religious sentiments, love, and trust relations. As one of my students cynically stated, "This is the part of yourself that you
leave on the doorstep as you enter law school and hope it's still
there three years later when you leave."
Although law school does not focus on this, the relation between the professional and personal identity defines each lawyer's future. Some lawyers attempt to separate their professional
role and their personal identity. During the day these lawyers
act as "hired guns," remaining neutral to clients' motives and
ends. They use their professional role as a justification to distance themselves from any accountability for the consequences
of their actions or the unfairness of the ends they may serve.
After five o'clock, these lawyers can again become humanists,
concerned about others and society. This relationship of personal identity and professional role may lead to a schizophrenia
and self-delusion ri~ky to both the lawyer's personal and professional existence.
Another resolution, visible in the 1960's and early 1970's, allows the personal portion of the self to dominate and demean
the professional role. One's personal or political goals are served
through manipulation of the professional role, undercutting all
limits imposed by professional codes of conduct. Instrumental
manipulation of the rules, deception, and coercion are limited
only to the extent that such tactics would not be effective.
In the most frequent resolution, the professional role dominates the personal identity. Most lawyers occasionally allow role
appropriate behavior to surface in inappropriate settings; a modest example is the attorney whose dinner conversations with a
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non-lawyer spouse are governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Adversarial behavior sometimes occurs in personal relations when listening, caring, and supporting would be more appropriate responses. For some lawyers, occasional becomes
habitual; adversarial, analytic, non-emotive responses erode
other personal capacities. In the extreme case, this role encroachment is so complete that "being a lawyer" defines one's
total self.
Obviously, a healthy resolution of one's professional role and
personal identity enables personal meanings and values to find
expression in professional work. An integrated and autonomous
person maintains the capacity, disposition, and sensitivity to respond appropriately when acting in or out of a professional role.
While professional tasks serve personal values, personal motives
do not sabotage role obligations. For a well-integrated person,
the learning, choices, and actions of professional tasks are congruent with furtherance of the personal dimensions.

II.

THE CRITIQUES OF LEGAL EDUCATION

The case method has been the predominant mode of legal education since Langdell introduced it at Harvard in 1870.
Through case analysis students are introduced to the basic doctrines of the law and the modes of analysis and fact analogy that
are essential to legal thought. Students study legal reasoning
and policy analysis in the broader context of the Socratic dialogue on a case. The case method was seen as an escape from
legal formalism, a way to teach "the living law" instead of abstract legal theories. 8 Over sixty years ago, however, Alfred Reed
criticized the case method, especially in the second and third
years of law school.' He focused on· overreliance on the case
3. Roscoe Pound, whose training was in science, not law, noted in 1903: "As teachers
of science were slow to put the microscope and the scalpel into the hands of students and
permit them to study nature, not books, so have we been fearful of putting reports into
[law students'] hands, and permitting them to study the living law." J. REDLICH, THE
COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS 41 (1914),
quoted in R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE
1980s 119 (1983). It is ironic that the bar was inclined to more overarching theories of
formalistic jurisprudence, and considered the case method "a mass of . . . 'practical' rubbish." The case method was too disconnected and detached to show the continuous and
steady fl.ow of the law and its more unitary concepts. Report of Committee on Legal
Education, 15 A.BA PROC. 350, 368 (1892), quoted in R. STEVENS, supra, at 59.
4. A REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF LAW 285, 369-88 (1921), cited in
Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977
B.Y.U. L. REV. 695, 703 n.10.
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method, flaws in the content covered, pedagogic inefficiency, and
the failure of law schools to provide adequate practical instruction to enable graduates to perform basic lawyering tasks
competently.
Many of today's criticisms of legal education sound strikingly
similar to Reed's. They can be divided into four areas: (a) a professional critique of the content and scope of legal education;
(b) a pedagogical critique of the methodology and its structural
and psychological deficiencies; (c) an academic critique of the
sufficiency of the law's intellectual basis for university study;
and (d) a sociological/political critique of legal education's failure to prepare graduates adequately for service to society.

A.

The Professional Critique

1. Case method content- Even before the Reed Report, the
bar criticized law schools' predominant fascination with analysis
of appellate cases. The case method was accused of inadequately
teaching the statutory and administrative law commonly used
by lawyers. Critics also noted that many important legal and social issues do not find their way into appellate cases.
2. Case method distortions- Critics also charge that the
case method provides an unrealistic view of legal disputes and
distorts students' understanding of how the law operates in society. The law school's simplistic model of rule analysis and application does not consider the essential ingredients in interpersonal and institutional complexities that give the law its
ultimate meaning. The case method takes the facts as given by
some appellate court or as varied by a law professor. Such facts
are artificial; they have been filtered by the judge, lawyers, and
parties. In reality, the incompleteness, tentativeness, ambiguity,
and conflict regarding facts, coupled with their malleability by
the biases of parties, witnesses, lawyers, judges, and jurors, make
the application of legal doctrine far different than the Socratic
dialogue would suggest. The case method focuses more on legal
issues than on the actors and institutions involved. Such an abstract approach is not the "living law." The case method fails to
train students to think like lawyers because its analysis is incomplete. Although the classroom discussion may appropriately
screen out the multiple complicating factors to initiate analysis
of an "ideal type" of legal problem, it does not later add the rich
context, the partial information, and the attempts to manipulate
that exist in the institutional settings in which legal doctrines
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find their real meaning. 11
The professor may acknowledge the existence of these contaminating factors but discounts them as not being worthy of
intellectual attention and analysis. When law professors-the
major role models in law students' initial professional socialization-focus on abstract ideas and legal issues to the exclusion of
the people involved, they convey an unstated message that the
legal issues, not the clients and their problems, are of greatest
importance. A second message exists, that there is a hierarchy of
interesting problems that great minds find worthy of analysis.
Many law graduates consider a matter worthy of their interest
only if it contains complicated legal issues. Yet most legal
problems, whether a securities registration or a divorce, do not
involve complicated legal issues. Many practitioners tend to discount their work and to be discounted by other lawyers if they
are not working on complex or cutting-edge legal issues. If the
non-doctrinal issues of practicing law are given thoughtful attention, they are as interesting and complex as the substantive law.
Most clients and legal problems are of enormous complexity and
interest if the personal, skills, and institutional dimensions of
the case are thoroughly considered. Law schools miss an opportunity to demonstrate areas of importance and interest that accompany even the most commonplace legal matter. A truly humanistic legal education would infuse legal problems with a
serious analysis of the formidable personal and psychological elements of the participants, including the lawyers. This would
engage the students in the emotional depths of a case. If legal
theory and humanistic perspectives are taught without being
rooted in and reinforced by the problems of practice, students
may more easily discount or forget law school lessons on the
connection of theory to personal performance and institutional
dimensions once they commence their professional careers. 6
5. Frank compared the Langdell case method to a trip to a city in which the ultimate
destination was omitted from the ticket. J. FRANK, CouRTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY
IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 231 (1949).
6. Dean Terrance Sandalow notes the necessary relation of law, emotion, and a recognition of life's complexity:
A failure to devote class time to probing beneath the abstract language that judicial opinions typically-and statutes invariably-employ conveys to students the
lesson that emotion and the complexities of life are irrelevant to law. And by
leading students during a formative intellectual period to think only in abstract
categories, legal education can dull both feeling and their sensitivity to complexity . . . . The appropriate objective is not the release of feeling, but its education. This requires ... bringing feeling into contact with the full range of life's
possibilities, but it also requires [that] it be brought into contact with those general ideas we call knowledge.
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The case method obscures what is important in legal practice.
Law professors teach students not how to be practitioners but
how to be law review editors, appellate court clerks, law firm
memo writers and, if they are lucky, law professors. These lessons, of great importance for all lawyers, are nevertheless incomplete. Such lessons must be demythologized by contact with the
world of practice where many cases involve only interesting people and not interesting issues, and where economic realities or
institutional tolerance will not permit the full briefing and argument that law school learning anticipates.
Another criticism of the focus on appellate disputes suggests
that it socializes lawyers into greater reliance on the adversarial
mode, making the profession more litigious and confrontational
and less amenable to cooperative modes of private ordering and
regulation. 7
3. Curricular scope and method- Critics assert that the law
school curriculum focuses too much attention on doctrine. The
areas of substantive law have mushroomed, precluding the possibility of teaching the corpus juris in law school. Whether because of the pressures of the bar exam or because of the desire
to maintain legal education as the cheapest form of graduate education and to assure a market for the wares the faculty has to
offer, legal doctrine dominates the legal curriculum. Law schools
have diversified their offerings in recent years, but usually without dropping courses from the range of the legal subjects taught.
With statutes outdistancing case law in doctrinal expansion, the
case method has yielded to the problem method for teaching
Sandalow, The Moral Responsibility of Law Schools, 34 J. LEGAL Eouc. 163, 172 (1984).
Sandalow suggests that this can adequately be done in the classroom: "A skillful teacher
will lead students to read opinions imaginatively, with attention to the human possibilities that lie beneath their abstract language. The exploration of these possibilities, conjoined with consideration of their implications for judgment, offers opportunity for developing that fusion of feeling and intellect we call sensibility." Id. Sandalow does not
address the issue of whether the law professor, with no academic training or little or no
practice experience in these areas, is capable of developing adequate conceptual models
for abstract discussion of these subjects.
7. As Langdell assumed the deanship at Harvard, the leaders of the bar believed that
law school should prepare graduates for corporate practice and feared the case method's
preoccupation on litigated cases would encourage attorneys to sue rather than restrain
their clients' urges toward litigation.
The result of this elaborate study of actual disputes, and ignoring of the settled
doctrines that have grown out of past ones, is a class of graduates admirably
calculated to argue any side of any controversy . . . but quite unable to advise a
client when he is safe from litigation . . . . The student should not be so trained
as to think he is to be a mere hired gladiator.
Report of Committee on Legal Education, 15 A.BA PROC. 317, 340-41 (1892), quoted in
R. STEVENS, supra note 3, at 59.
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many statutory subjects. Yet, whatever the method of teaching
doctrine, much of this learning will become substantially outdated by legislative changes or will never be used by law graduates in practice. Most doctrine used by lawyers is learned or
relearned after graduation. Law schools should focus on teaching
how to learn and use the law competently and efficiently and not
on how much law can be taught in three years. 8
Bar review courses, commercial treatises, specialized reporter
services, and continuing legal education programs demonstrate
how well doctrine can be taught after graduation. Many of the
legal subjects law schools will insist on retaining could be taught
in less expensive ways. Law schools could use modern electronic
methods to cut costs and bring the best law professors into every
law school to teach doctrine. Programmed learning and computer networking offer opportunities for greater learner participation in coursework addressed to doctrine than do most law
classes. The resulting savings could be invested in small group,
in-depth teaching in selected areas of law and in courses on areas of legal practice presently neglected by most law schools. 9
4. Practical skills- The longstanding critique that the
overly theoretical nature of legal education distorts a student's
understanding of the law has had as its handmaiden for the last
half century the critique that law schools fail to train students
on the rudimentary skills necessary for minimal competence.
For over a century the bar has played a dominant role in setting the goals of legal education through bar admissions examinations and law school accreditation. While instrumental in the
formation of the Association of American Law Schools10 and
generally supportive of law schools' efforts to raise admission
standards, the ABA also struggled against what it viewed as the
excessively academic hiring and education patterns of law
schools. 11
8. Many law students take more and more doctrine courses because of insecurity
when, in reality, doctrine can be learned more readily in practice than can a thorough
understanding of many of the practice skills.
9. Bar examiners may need to cooperate by allowing the bar examination to be
phased over the first years of practice, like an actuary's examinations. Bar exams for
certification in areas of specialty would allow the initial exam to cover fewer areas, allowing for issuance of a limited license, the continuation of which would be contingent
on passing additional examinations.
10. The Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, at the urging of
Henry Wade Rogers, dean of the Michigan and Yale law schools, provided the organizational initiative in 1899 that led to the formation of the Association of American Law
Schools. R. STEVENS, supra note 3, at 96. It was not until 1914 that the AALS held meetings separate from the ABA meetings. Id. at 114.
11. In 1910 the ABA recommended a one-year clinical internship after law school
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The goals of legal education have found various articulations.
Early in the century, Dean Roscoe Pound noted that legal education should (1) teach the basic mental skills of legal analysis
and synthesis, (2) provide an understanding of the basic authoritative materials, (3) provide students a sense of the law as a social institution furthering social policies, and (4) lead students to
internalize a sense of craft in their future accomplishments and
undertakings in all these areas. 12 In his twenty years as
Harvard's dean, this non-lawyer leader of the nation's most powerful law school accepted the Langdellian premise that the study
of cases was the study of legal practice. Yet Harvard students
attacked the school for overreliance on the case method and a
bland curriculum. 18 Harvard's most recent curriculum study
shows that law schools continue to struggle with the same dilemmas that existed in Pound's time. 14
Dean Terrance Sandalow expressed concern about the risks to
legal education of aiming only at "fitting law students to the
professional roles" 111 they will play upon graduation. Such vocationalism demeans the students and the opportunities for intellectual and personal growth during law school. "The main object
of legal education [should be] the enhancement of [students']
capacities to realize their human potential as it is understood in
our culture. " 18 Law school goals include the formation of those
character traits and intellectual capacities that enhance clear
thought, intelligent feeling, and knowing action. This entails
more than the lawyering skills of analysis and advocacy. Legal
education should assist students to "avoid common hazards to
clear thought, such ... as self-interest, provincialism of time
and place, overdependence on familiar categories of thought, the
inability to tolerate uncertainty, and sentimentality."17 These
temptations are hazards to clear thought precisely because they
before admission to the bar. This is strikingly similar to Chief Justice Burger's recent
suggestion. The ABA unsuccessfully asked for its acceptance by the AALS in 1913. Dean
Rogers, who earlier had criticized the case method as not suitable for all students, led
the academic attack on this clinical year by asserting that the case method provided
practical training sufficient for admission to the bar. R STEVENS, supra note 3, at 120.
See also Manning, Law Schools and Lawyer Schools-Two-Tier Legal Education, 26 J.
LEGAL Eouc. 379, 382 (1974).
12. Prof. David F. Cavers, Seminar on Legal Education, Harvard University Law
School (1973).
13. R STEVENS, supra note 3, at 137 & n.53.
14. See Michaelman, The Parts and the Whole: Non-Euclidean Curricular Geometry, 32 J. LEGAL Eouc. 352, 353 (1982).
15. Sandalow, supra note 6, at 167.
16. Id. at 168.
17. Id. at 171.
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affect a lawyer's feelings, motives, and actions. Principles and
feelings must be informed by a "knowledge of life" in guiding or
judging conduct for the lawyer. Dean Sandalow notes that the
skills of analysis and synthesis are broadened by contact with
new subjects other than legal doctrine.
Sandalow, however, seems to have confidence that such goals
can be achieved without going beyond the walls of the legal
academy. Frank Michaelman suggests that active or experimental learning about practice "is an inseparable aspect of proper
cognitive learning. It is axiomatic in learning theory that when
cognitive studies are accompanied by active engagement in their
application to concrete problems, a likely result is fuller comprehension, better retention, and apter recall of the cognitive material. "18 Law schools have an educational responsibility to offer
some applied skills courses to give students confidence in their
ability to perform effectively as lawyers. This criticism of the
law school's failure to teach students the skills necessary to be
competent trial lawyers has intensified since Chief Justice Burger's Sonnett Memorial Lecture in 1973. 19
Many have criticized law schools for failure to teach human
relations skills such as interviewing, counseling, decision making,
fact investigation, and case planning. The counter argument
notes that law schools provide a unique educational opportunity
for students to immerse themselves in theoretical analysis. Practice skills can be acquired more efficiently after graduation. A
university-based school of law should make those contributions
to critical reflection and theory that are less available after
graduation.
This argument assumes that teaching students to think like
lawyers requires most of the three years of law school and that
added doctrinal courses are useful vehicles for the continuation
of this thought development process. It could be, however, that
refinement of legal thinking would better evolve in the more
complex arena of actual cases, where it will need to be exercised
in the future, rather than in additional courses on doctrine. The
modeling and application of law school's high standards of
thought and analysis to the multiple dimensions of an on-going
legal problem would make law school learning more transferable
and durable in practice. Lawyers are taught in law school how to
learn doctrine. This equips graduates with a competence to ex18. Michaelman, supra note 14, at 353-54.
19. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973).
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pand their knowledge of the law. Law students are not equipped
with similar competence in how to develop other legal skills. 20
While books and Continuing Legal Education programs have
refined the teaching of doctrine, thoughtful training in fact investigation, interviewing, counseling, advocacy, and negotiation
are less well developed, less widely available, and demand blocks
of time that are awkwardly large for most practitioners.
Both law students and practitioners want more practical offerings in law school. Zemans and Rosenblum 21 found that practitioners feel that law schools ignore many of the skills most important to their current practice-the communication skills of
counseling and interviewing, negotiations, investigation, and advocacy. Their schools did not even apprise them of the importance of such skills to their future professional competence.
These attorneys believe that many such skills areas can be effectively taught in law schools. 22
In the Zemans and Rosenblum study, lawyers ranked four
skills as most important: (1) fact gathering; (2) capacity to marshal facts and order them so that concepts can be applied; (3)
instilling others' confidence in the attorney; and (4) effective
oral expression. These practical skills are not peculiar to the
practice of law. The three skills or areas of knowledge ranked
next are more central to the law school mission: (5) ability to
understand and interpret opinions, regulations, and statutes; (6)
knowledge of substantive law; and (7) legal research. Then came:
(8) negotiating; (9) drafting legal documents; and (10) understanding others' viewpoints to deal more effectively with them.
Three of four lawyers responding ranked all of these as important. Only about one in three lawyers ranked knowledge of political science, psychology, economics, sociology, and accounting
skills as important. 23 The attorneys attributed learning of the
four most important skills to their own experience; 24 the next
three they credited to their legal education. The Chicago lawyers
20. Most lawyers in the Zemans and Rosenblum study of the Chicago bar felt that
the capacity to define a problem and to know where to seek the answer are vital skills
Jaw schools provide. F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION
136-39 (1981).
21. Zemans & Rosenblum, Preparation for the Practice of Law-The Views of the
Practicing Bar, 1980 ABF RESEARCH J. 1, 5-6 (1980).
22. The Stevens, Pipkin, and the Zemans and Rosenblum studies found that law students wanted more practical courses. They wanted more emphasis on legal research and
writing. See Pipkin, Legal Education: The Consumers' Perspective, 1976 ABF RESEARCH
J. 1161, 1169-73; F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note 20, at 135-44.
23. See F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note 20, 135-44.
24. See id. at 135, Table 6.4.
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thought that law school could appropriately contribute to acquisition of certain skills-fact gathering, effective legal drafting
and oral argument, interviewing, and understanding the viewpoint of others. Law schools were not viewed as capable of developing the ability to inspire the confidence of others.
Similarly, Baird studied the classes of 1955, 1965, and 1970
from six schools (including Michigan) five years or more after
their graduation. 211 With the exception of knowledge of statutory
law, which was ranked second, the practitioners rated general
practice competencies more highly than substantive knowledge
as the elements essential to adequate legal performance. Baird,
like Zemans and Rosenblum, found that the law school competencies were important to practice, particularly the ability to analyze and synthesize law and facts. Yet, four out of ten lawyers
considered the ability to write, communicate effectively, research, draft legal documents, counsel clients, and negotiate essential, while only one in four considered knowledge of common
law essential. Baird found that overall, lawyers were not dissatisfied with their legal education for what it did, but felt it failed to
attempt to do more.
Most practitioners acquire practice skills by muddling
through, commonly at the expense of their initial clients. They
develop these skills by non-critically adopting behaviors of available role models, good or bad. New attorneys who enter more
elite practice settings, with better role models and more attention focused on refinement of practice skills, may develop good
skills with speed, efficiency, and reflective competency. Yet,
many law firms do not provide the attention and supervision required for adequate skill development. The bulk of law graduates not entering elite law firms or governmental departments
acquire a deficient post-graduate education where ineffectiveness often masquerades as competence. 26

B. Pedogogical Critiques
1. Structural efficiencies- Commentators criticize legal
training for its lack of clear structure. A smorgasbord of doctrinal offerings fails to recognize the basic premises of learning the25. Baird, A Survey of the Relevance of Legal Training to Law School Graduates, 29
LEGAL EDUC. 264 (1978).
26. Access to competent legal assistance at affordable costs for Americans other than
the rich or the exceptionally injured constitutes one of the greatest challenges to our
system of justice.
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ory that learning be structured to challenge students continually
and to build on past learning. The curriculum also contains considerable overlap in coverage of doctrine. The course structure
maintains student dependence and teacher control in the second
and third years instead of greater student responsibility and autonomy for their own learning as their competencies develop.
2. Psychological deficiencies- Most law students approach
graduate education with a predisposition to learn, based on their
past successes. Law school confronts them with its Socratic puzzles that seem to have no closure, apparent structure, or relevance. Students commonly receive negative classroom feedback.
Evaluation occurs by exams scheduled after long periods of students' uncertainty about their progress. Student evaluation generally consists of a grade with no explanation of what they did
well and where they can improve.
For many, this frustrating experience destroys the self-esteem
and confidence necessary to take the risks required to learn. The
experience and insecurities that result retard motivation, inquiry, and creativity for these students. Many law students learn
to hate learning and the law school process; some become seriously alienated. 27 Others defend their sense of self by disengaging from law school and taking comfort in the hope that "real
lawyering" is not like law school. In the second and third years
increased absence from and passing in class occur as students
put more of their energy into job hunting or part time jobs. 28

C.

The Academic Critique

While the law school holds itself out to the non-university
world as providing service to society in both training professionals and providing analysis to guide appellate courts and law
makers, it represents to the university world that law professors
are serious academics. In what now seems a hoax, when law initially gained university admission, it held itself out as a science.
27. Carrington & Conley, The Alienation of Law Students, 75 MICH. L. REv. 887
(1977); Carrington & Conley, Negative Attitudes of Law Students: A Replication of the
Alienation and Dissatisfaction Factors, 76 MICH. L. REv. 1036 (1978). Discussions with
more recent students reveal continued frustration that limits motivation. The Carrington-Conley survey should be conducted again to compare current students' levels of
dissatisfaction and alienation.
28. Stevens found a sharp decline, after the first semester, in the time and energy
students devoted to law school; by their senior year many students spend the equivalent
of only two days a week studying for their courses. Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551, 652-53 (1973).
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Even law's modified policy science aspirations after World War
II did not command the respect of the university's true intelligentsia. The addition, in recent years, of psychology, economics,
history, philosophy, and jurisprudence to the law school curriculum provides limited justification for the law school's claim to be
an extension of liberal education in the university's humanist
tradition.
Law schools are powerful units of a university, not always because of the strength of their intellectual scholarship, but because of their connections to power in the broader society. Another source of strength is that legal education, with the Socratic
method, is cheap-law schools provide the cheapest form of
graduate education and make money for some universities. Although many faculty members have made important and unique
contributions to fields of study, most legal scholarship would not
find acceptance in other academic units. 29 Much of the best legal
scholarship is not strictly academic, but rather focuses on practical application of legal theories to current political issues. These
contributions are indeed important to society-though possibly
not as important as law faculties might like to think. Law
professors teach seminars on areas of research interest. Yet, students commonly view seminars as intellectual hobby horses on
which they must ride only because faculty have imposed a seminar requirement. Many students do not get into the seminar of
their choice; others have no desire for specialized research.
Without students with a serious academic interest, even these
focused seminars rarely provide occasion for law teachers to advance their research.
Without some radical change in the generalist inclinations of
most law students or the structure of legal education, academic
policy analysis and empirical research are not likely to receive
greater attention. If law schools created separate programs of
professional and research degrees, at least one portion of the law
school would attract a cluster of scholars and students committed to academic research. 30
Thus, law schools face a dilemma. When they increase the sophistication and empirical basis of legal scholarship, they distance themselves from the interests of the majority of law stu29. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REv. 637,
645-46 (1968).
30. The Curriculum Study Project Committee of the American Association of Law
Schools, in 1971, suggested a two year J.D. degree followed by either practical training or
,more academic research for graduate students interested in teaching, not practice. P.
CARRINGTON, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF LAW 2 (1971).
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dents and the practicing bar. 31 The purer the legal academy's
thought, the greater its impotence.
Many serious academics in the university are critical and resentful of the higher pay, lighter work loads, and the lesser
quantity and quality of intellectual production in the law
school. 32 They also question whether law schools have a sufficiently consistent theoretical or methodological framework with
which to provide students with the skills and data needed to attempt an analysis of society's fundamental problems or to examine society's fundamental premises.

D.

The Sociological-Political Critique

The treatment of students in the classroom and throughout
the law school experience inspires another critique of law
schools. Although they cater to academically gifted students, law
schools do not treat most students as adults. Faculty, with varying degrees of inte~sity, view many students as ignorant, unmotivated, insincere, selfish, materialistic, and unwilling and unable
to take greater responsibility for their professional growth and
development.
Commentators attack the classroom experience as demeaning,
threatening, and damaging to students' egos. 33 In the classroom,
the intellectually more powerful demonstrate how to treat the
less powerful. Students come to accept as inevitable, even legitimate, the hierarchical ordering in class rankings, firm rankings,
client rankings, substantive law rankings, and social rankings.
31. For a concerned analysis of legal scholarship, see American Legal Scholarship:
Directions and Dilemmas, 33 J. LEGAL Eouc. 403 (1983).
32. For a criticism by a political scientist, see Hacker, The Sham of Professional
Schools: How Not to Educate an Elite, HARPER'S, Oct. 1981, at 22.
33. Nader has referred to the Socratic method as a game that only one can play:
Harvard Law's most enduring contribution to legal education was the mixing of
the case method of study with the Socratic method of teaching . . . . [T]hese
techniques were tailor-made to transform intellectual arrogance into pedagogical
systems that humble the student into accepting its premises, levels of abstractions and choice of subjects. Law professors take delight in crushing egos in order to acculturate the students to what they called 'legal reasoning' or 'thinking
like a lawyer.' The process is a highly sophisticated form of mind control that
trades off breadth of vision and factual inquiry for freedom to roam in an intellectual cage.
Nader, Crumbling of the Old Order: Law Schools and Law Firms, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct.
11, 1969, at 20. See also Kennedy, How Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REV. L. &
Soc. ACTION 71 (1970); Kennedy, Legal Education and Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J.
LEGAL Eouc. 591 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy, Legal Education]; Savoy, Towards a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444 (1970).
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They view realist, abstract, "hard" thought as supreme and
emotive, value-laden, "soft" idealism as inappropriate in addressing the tough issues of the law. 34 In law school competition,
contentious individualism, aggressiveness, ruthlessness, pragmatism, instrumentalism, and the capitalistic ethic are stressed
over cooperation, accommodation, compassion, community, idealism, and a principled or professional ethic. 3 " The emotional
rage that may be the motivating force necessary for serious law
reform is not welcome in law school discussions.
Critics charge that law schools, in addition to teaching students to accept hierarchy, socialize students into accepting the
legitimacy of the primary economic, social, and institutional ordering of society. A formalistic approach to morality limits normative thinking and proper behavior to rules and rule compliance. Without the intellectual training to question the basic
premises underlying the legal system and to construct alternative models that have greater claims on justice, law students acquire an incremental, reformist attitude toward law and society.
They are taught that things are basically okay, and the legal system needs only some minor adjustments. 36
Law schools also convey the message that lawyers deserve
power, status, and material rewards because they safeguard the
social order. The social order functions autonomously while the
legal system provides a procedurally fair approach to resolving
conflicts through the courts. The system of technical and procedural law absolves "neutral, professional" lawyers of responsibility for their clients' ends and behaviors. With political activism
and resistance seen as unlawyerlike and excessive reformism
seen as unprofitable, students are presented with limited career
images related largely to types of lawyering and of clients.
Students are graduated from law school unprepared to practice law, and dependent on future learning opportunities to complete their professional development. Large firms have greater
resources for providing such clinical training than most other career options except a limited number of government jobs. Train34. In comparing the specific legal skills of Chicago lawyers with the Heinz and
Laumann prestige ranking of law areas, Zemans and Rosenblum found that the high
prestige specialties were associated with the hard analytic skills and the less prestigious
specialties were associated with the softer, interpersonal skills. See Zemans & Rosenblum, supra note 21, at 5-6; Heinz & Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client Interests,
Professional Roles and Social Hierarchies, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1111 (1978).
35. See Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL
Enuc. 247 (1978).
36. Kennedy, Legal Education, supra note 33; see also Cramton, supra note 35;
Cramton, Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL Eouc. 321 (1982).
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ing opportunities, combined with the economic and status rewards of large firm practice, make the preferred career choice all
the clearer. 37
Thus, law schools are criticized for channeling students to
large firms that address only a limited number of society's most
pressing problems. The best students, best firms, and best faculties are happy with this arrangement. Students want access to
the rewards offered by large law firms. Firms want students
ranked by grades, dependent on the law firm's training, deferential to partners, and accepting of the existing legal order.
Faculty members want students who show respect for their superior intelligence, defer to their authority and status, and make
limited demands on their time. They may also want a wealthy,
prestigious, and powerful alumni-more readily assured by directing students to large law firms.
Law schools have a responsibility to present students with alternative views of practice and legal careers as possible and worthy goals. Law students begin their studies with great idealism.
Many wish to serve disadvantaged persons or causes. Yet, they
do not find in the law school a professional role model that will
allow them to fulfill the social responsibility of the profession to
seek greater justice. The present isolated, esoteric, and largely
non-critical curriculum constitutes inadequate preparation for
this undertaking. As Derek Bok has argued, if law schools were
"not training lawyers but preparing 'leaders of the bar' . . . one
would suppose that students . . . would be studying ways of creating simpler rules, less costly legal proceedings, and greater legal protection for the poor and middle class. " 38
If law reform were the goal of legal education, law schools
would need to be radically changed. Lawyers make and enforce
the law, and they assist clients in their struggles for power
through the law. Yet, entrenched injustices cannot be countered
without lawyers. Law schools could do more in devising theories
and models for reforms in the legal and social systems. These
efforts would encompass new career options as well as enhanced
opportunities within traditional career choices for professional
service to society.
The multiple criticisms of law school have been summarized
in the shrillest terms by one of the primary exponents of clinical
37. Large firms also have a generous government subsidy for their on-the-job clinical
training because the client fees that support the training are tax deductible to corporate
clients.
38. Bok, A Flawed System, HARV. MAc., May-June 1983, at 38, 45.
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legal education, Gary Bellow: 39
Most law is taught as if marshalling arguments on both
sides of an issue were its end all and be all. There is very
little closure around the question of right and wrong as
the class moves from one case to the next. Indeed, justice
as a criteria for decision is often dismissed in the first
three days of classes as soft-headed and unrealistic. . . .
[L]aw school is empirically irrelevant, theoretically
flawed, pedagogically dysfunctional and expensive.

III.

GOALS OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION

Clinicians have variously identified the educational goals of
clinical legal education over the last decade of experimentation.
There has been some debate about whether clinical legal education is a methodology for teaching about practice or a series of
separate substantive subjects. As a colleague stated, clinical law
"puts color in the empty outlines of the legal comic book.""0
While clinical teaching methods can present substantive law
with greater depth and comprehension than a more traditional
course, it is an expensive means to teach substantive doctrine.
Traditional law school methods are more efficient, even though
they may engage the students less intensely than a clinical
course. If second and third year law students become bored
studying more areas of substantive law, the solution does not lie
in teaching all of these subjects clinically, but in cutting down
on doctrine and focusing on other aspects of learning essential to
effective and reflective practice.
In clinical legal education, substantive subjects should be vehicles for learning about the difference between legal theory and
the law as it operates in practice-the contextual, interpersonal,
performance, and social elements of applying legal theory. Many
substantive subjects can effectively carry these educational
messages. The lessons learned in any appropriately selected area
of doctrine can be transferred by the student to other legal areas, providing further insights, professional growth, and personal
development in future practice.
39.
Enuc.
40.
at 16,

Bellow, On Talking Tough to Each Other: Comments on Condlin, 33 J. LEGAL
619, 622 (1983). (The last sentence is Al Sacks's summary of Bellow's thesis.)
Conard, Letter from the Law Clinic, U. Mien. L. QUADRANGLE NOTES, Fall 1973,
18.
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An effective clinical teacher acts as a translator and interpreter for the students. The clinician introduces the students to
the workings of the legal system. More important, the clinician
helps the students become familiar with their new role and identity. Although people learn from unguided experience, analysis
and interpretation quicken the pace of learning and foster the
habit of reflection on experience.
Building on the analytic skills learned in traditional classes,
clinical teachers should encourage similar habits of inquiry, testing, and critique about the skills of legal practice-interviewing,
counseling, decision making, investigation, case preparation, negotiation, and advocacy. Clinics should continue students' development of research and writing skills. Students will confront
their ignorance in addressing real problems. Lessons in developing and maintaining a high level of competence in a real world
context with its time and resource constraints will prove more
durable than the lessons learned in the more artificial and protected classroom setting.
Clinics should focus student attention on the interpersonal
and institutional dimensions of the world of law practice.
Clinical instructors help students analyze their experience by
questioning how decisions are made in client interviews, student-supervisor interchanges, and the institutions in which the
students are practicing. Students should be encouraged to articulate the power and authority relations, emotive inputs, hidden
agendas, institutional access and leverage points, as well as the
effect of personality, bias, emotion, and status on outcome. Students must struggle with their own decision making and actions
under conditions of incomplete information and uncertainty.
Clinical education permits students to integrate into a single
case the multiple subjects that they learn separately in their
other course work-civil procedure, contracts, commercial transactions, creditor's rights, evidence. In supervised fieldwork; students will also integrate their knowledge of legal theory, of legal
context, and of psychology with their own personal abilities, insecurities, efforts, values, and judgments.
Clinical teachers find students motivated to learn in clinical
courses. In such courses students gain confidence and a sense of
accomplishment that adds to their self-esteem.
Students should also experience the meaning of the special
role limitations and obligations that constitute professional responsibility. Clinical teachers should aid students in "issue spotting" the pervasive ethical problems of legal practice. Yet, effective clinical training must go beyond this to provide an open
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environment for discussion and debate about what behaviors are
appropriate for a lawyer and how appropriate behavior is commonly sabotaged by psychological blind spots. Student attorneys
will be involved in the fact development process in which lawyers affect what facts get disclosed and how they are developed.
They can see how confidentiality affects communication and
trust. Students will experience the constant choices about deception and manipulation that lawyers and clients fac~ in their interactions with each other, opponents, and legal institutions.
Throughout the clinical work, the supervisor should assist
each student to gain self-knowledge. Students can be encouraged
to discuss how their emotions, personality, and behaviors may
limit their effectiveness with clients, opponents, or the institutions in which they operate. Supervisor feedback and use of
videotape can help students develop a better understanding of
how they present themselves-what verbal cues and self-effacing
or self-aggrandizing characteristics they manifest, how well they
listen and empathize, and how appropriately they respond. Students can become more aware of the effects of their insecurity,
anger, and confusion. Their interactions with clients, opponents,
judges, supervisors, and other students provide opportunities to
analyze how they use and respond to authority and the degree
that they act on untested assumptions, struggle to control situations, and attribute their own meanings to relations with others,
thereby failing to achieve real understanding. Clinic students experience feeling responsible for a client who is dependent on
their competence, effort, and support. Student self-awareness
can more easily be encouraged if the seminar includes some individual case review with a person well trained in psychology.
Such a person can help students perceive external demands and
internal impulses that sabotage professional behavior. 41
In fieldwork, the temptations to turn a principled ethic into
an instrumental morality to achieve a client's end become visible. Unlike courses on professional responsibility, clinical experiences demonstrate the important difference between the intellectual task of defining the right action and the psychological
and motivational states necessary to take the appropriate action.
The rewards from minor rule breaking are high and risks of detection and sanction are low in legal practice. Desires to help
41. See Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 16 J. LEGAL Eouc. 1, 20-23 (1963); Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence:
Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. C1N. L. REV. 91, 153-57 (1968); Watson,
Lawyers and Professionalism: A Further Psychiatric Perspective on Legal Education, 8
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 248, 265-78 (1975).
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clients and to succeed in a task enhance the temptations to
amoral instrumentalism. Clinical supervisors should use the ethical dilemmas and temptations of clinical fieldwork to assist students to develop an awareness that professionalism entails not
only knowing rules, but also a sense of obligation, a disposition
to act appropriately, and an inner discipline for clear thinking
and right action in the face of temptations to blindness, rationalization, or intentional deviance from rules. 42
Students in fieldwork can often observe in other attorneys the
end product of patterns of professional corner-cutting. Such behaviors have consequences for the lawyer that are cumulative,
corrosive of capacities to recognize and select appropriate behavior, and hard to contain or reverse. In clinics, students should
look beyond fixed ethical rules and begin to derive from their
experience their own generalizable principles for professional behavior. A clinic experience cannot complete this process, but it
can help students begin to develop habits of more careful
thought and considered action about ethical problems that lawyers encounter.
While a clinical course cannot comprehensively cover all interpersonal, professional, and psychological skills, it can demonstrate to students their importance in the practice of law and
initiate the habits of asking questions and seeking answers about
such subjects. The clinic experience makes such topics a proper
subject for public articulation and questioning with other lawyers. Students should be urged to find colleagues in practice who
will continue the enterprise of dialogue and analysis.
If clinical education can help broaden the agenda of analysis
beyond the legal doctrine and the immediate skill involved to
the broader questions about the contextual, the personal and
psychological, and the ethical and social elements of legal practice, then the experience will enrich the students' future practice
and enhance their chances for personal and professional growth.
Clinical education seeks to teach students to become self-learners in their practice of law. Unlike the doctrine courses that may
never be used or may become obsolete, an appropriate clinical
42.
If we lived in a State where virtue was profitable, common sense would make us

good, and greed would make us saintly . . . . But since in fact we see that avarice, anger, envy, pride, sloth, lust and stupidity commonly profit far beyond
humility, chastity, fortitude, justice and thought, [we] have to choose, to be
human at all . . . why then perhaps we must stand fast a little . . . .
Thomas More to his daughter, Margaret, in Act 2, R. BoLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 14041 (1962).
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agenda for learning will stay relevant throughout the student's
legal career. If students get some direction in law school and
build confidence in developing their lawyering skills, they may
feel le_ss constrained in their initial job choices.
The above agenda for clinical courses make the learning from
experience in the inhibiting and distracting world of practice the
prime subject. Such learning complements traditional learning
from law school authorities. Learning to learn from experience
does not entail abandoning theory and ignoring the ideas of
others. If undertaken properly, clinical teaching should encourage such pursuits. 43 Autonomy, however, requires learning
from experience as well as from authorities and their theories.
Autonomy requires freedom from dependence on received wisdom alone. It entails testing the theories of others and generating your own theories. Because all theory is rooted in experience,
students cannot effectively learn how to test and generate the
theories of practice without some exposure to the actual world of
·1aw.
For most law students, clinic provides a demythologizing experience as they test the theories of law in practice. In clinics
that represent the accused, the mentally ill, or the poor, the theory testing and theory building is even more dramatic as students examine the market system of delivering legal services and
the workings of "law" and "justice" at the bottom of the legal
system. Experience representing the least advantag~d in society
provides unique opportunities to critique the legal system and
the adversary model. Learning to cope in cases representing the
least powerful eases the transition to representing more powerful
clients. If law schools would focus more attention on these
broader subjects and modes of thinking that arise in practice
and lessen slightly the number of courses on doctrine and legal
analysis, law graduates would be better prepared to serve themselves, their clients, and society.
Such a clinical agenda, if done thoughtfully, is neither antiintellectual, unbecoming of a university, nor mere vocationalism.
It is in full accord with the goals of legal and humanistic education. Supervised instruction in the world of practice-to which
law students are soon to be abandoned-offers the best potential
"to enhance the capacity of students to think clearly, to feel in43. "An interest in the practical should not preclude, on the contrary it should invite,
a lively interest in theory." Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303, 1321
(1947).
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telligently, and to act knowingly."""

IV.

STUDENT AND ALUMNI RESPONSE TO CLINICAL COURSES

Clinical legal education has been labeled the most significant
innovation in legal education in recent decades.n Arguments
over its pedagogic utility have been fought and won at most law
schools. Evaluations by Michigan students from 1973 to present
show that 99 % of clinic students would recommend it to others.
The overwhelming number of students who have completed the
clinic felt that they learned a great deal. For those skeptical of
student evaluations as a measure of the worth of a course, the
Student Senate in 1981 polled a random sample of nearly 200
Michigan graduates who had taken the clinic from 1970 to 1980
to determine if practitioners were less enthusiastic than students. Ninety-five percent of the respondents stated that they
would take the clinic again instead of a comparable number of
credit hours in traditional classes, if they were in law school today. A similar percentage disagreed with the statement that
clinic experience was unnecessary because it provided what they
would have learned anyway in their first year of practice. When
asked to compare the applicability of their clinical experience
with their other law courses, 94 % found it at least as useful, and
69 % found it more useful.
General Michigan Alumni Surveys of the classes of 1966, 1967,
1976, and 1977 show 28 % of the respondents suggested clinical
courses be increased in the law school. 46 Of all the doctrine and
skills courses listed, clinical law received the second highest response for increases, following only suggestions for more courses
on negotiation.
A research effort by Educational Testing Service to measure
clinical skills demonstrated that law students with clinical experience were more effective in interviewing exercises than nonclinical students. 47
Clinical legal education joined the law school club when students and the bar were criticizing the overly theoretical curricu44. Sandalow, supra note 6, at 173 (1984).
45. Gee & Jackson, supra note 4, at 881 (footnote omitted).
46. See Adams & Chambers, supra note 2, at 18.
47. The author and several other clinicians developed several simulation interview
exercises, which ETS field tested for reliability before assessing law students. D. ALDERMAN, F. EVANS & G. WILDER, ASSESSING CLINICAL SKILLS IN LEGAL EDUCATION: SIMULATION
EXERCISES IN CLIENT INTERVIEWING (1980).
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lar offerings of law school. It was a period of optimism about the
law's ability to effect reform if the disadvantaged obtained representation as competent as the representation available to the
privileged. The Ford Foundation's seed money provided the final important ingredient.
Today, students are less interested in law reform. Many of the
easy victories in civil rights, welfare law, and housing procedures
· have been won, only to be undercut by other social forces. Advances in criminal procedure have limited the worst abuses but
hopes for comprehensive reforms in criminal justice are diminished; few lawyers believe that they can affect the causes of
crime or the chances for rehabilitation of the convicted. Reformist notions, while not less needed, have encountered resistance in
society. With lessened opportunities for students to act on their
idealism through reformist activities, law students in greater
numbers have turned to concerns about careers in a tightening
job market. Thus, the early reformist forces of clinical programs
have faded.
With declining law school enrollments and limited external
funding for clinical courses, economic pressures encourage law
schools to reduce clinical fieldwork courses and substitute simulation courses that focus primarily on lawyer's skills. Although
clinical teachers have refined and widely adopted simulation exercises for skills training, students have consistently given them
lower evaluations than actual fieldwork experiences. Simulations
are effective for certain learning but they are always artificial;
students are less motivated to participate than they are in a few,
carefully selected, real cases.
Given the changes of attitude and economics, clinics must
prove their worth in their capacity to train law students in the
skills and professional dimensions of their work that traditional
law school courses neglect.
V.

THE LIMITATIONS AND PROBLEMS OF CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION

In the years that clinical programs were struggling to gain a
foothold in law schools, they were overzealous in their claims.
The most thoughtful criticism of clinical programs has come
from within its ranks, through the writings of Robert Condlin.
He criticizes clinics for not having a sophisticated understanding
of lawyering or of domination and manipulation in the world of
practice. Clinicians fail to demonstrate the critical self-reflection
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that they purport an ability to teach. They focus almost exclusively on adversary skills to the exclusion of developing more
collaborative modes of lawyering better equipped to serve the
needs of society. While purporting to have a reformist agenda
pointing toward a fairer legal system with a greater claim to justice, clinicians have no coherent theory from which to criticize
the present system. Absent a consistent theory of law, practice,
or society, clinical programs cannot offer viable hopes for a better system that will redress the issues of racial and sexual discrimination, the maldistribution of resources and opportunities,
or the unequal access to affect and use the law in our society.
Finally, Condlin asserts that clinicians have no research methodologies from which they could generate sophisticated knowledge
of the operation of the legal system in society. Having little of
intellectual interest to share with their non-clinical colleagues,
they distance themselves from the remainder of the faculty and
defensively immunize themselves from criticism. 48
All of these criticisms are legitimate. The fact that many of
them could be addressed to most traditional law faculty does not
remove their sting. To these failings, others could be added.
Clinics' desire to find threshold cases appropriate for student
trial experience conflicts with the possible social good of simplifying the law and delawyering many areas where access to a fair
and legally correct outcome depends on access to a lawyer. 49
Being victims of their own legal education and practice experience, clinical teachers are generally unversed in those theories
from neighboring fields that are relevant to their teaching. Most
clinicians are not well read in psychology, economics, history,
and philosophy, nor do they affiliate with others who have adequate training and experience in these fields. As a result, clinical
educators, failing to generate new theories about the law in operation, are also ineffective in applying such learning that exists in
related areas of study.
Condlin, Clinical Education in the Seventies: An Appraisal of the Decade, 33 J.
604, 607, 610 (1983). See also, Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for Learning in Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 MD. L. REV. 223, 278-81
(1981).
49. For example, a dose of the adversarial system has been prescribed for juvenile,
mental health, and child abuse and neglect proceedings. Because threshold practice opportunities and funding opportunities exist in these fields, some of which may still get
goverment funding, many clinics seize the chance for courtroom exposure. In doing so,
the clinics continue to professionalize the field and increase individuals' dependence on
lawyers. Some clinicians legitimize extension of the adversary model to every case. To
assure a continued flow of cases for students to test their adversary skills, clinicians may
blind themselves to both the need and the potential for reform and delawyerizing many
tasks.
48.
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A final criticism attacks the overall legal and academic quality
of most clinical teachers. Many are undistinguished in either
their academic or practice backgrounds and are considered of
lesser intellectual merit than the average traditional law teacher.
Notwithstanding these legitimate criticisms, the clinical movement in its first decade has had some success. For example, a
number of educational materials on interviewing, counseling,
case planning, trial advocacy, and negotiations have been developed. Although these materials vary in scope and degree of sophistication, they are far more structured and thoughtful than
anything that law students were exposed to in the past.Go
Various videotape materials have also been developed, as have
innovative teaching methods to enhance the clinical experience.
Law school programs using clinical methods and materials can
provide far more organized and less pressured learning of lawyering skills than is generally available in the serendipitous initial years of legal practice. With better teaching materials, a
more careful choice of cases to maximize learning instead of generating a fee, and clinical teachers whose primary goal is educational, a good clinical course provides superior professional
training than is available in even the best law firm
environments.
If one focuses on the more modest claim of clinical education-that it can contribute to professional development by introducing students to the rules, role demands, rites, and rituals
of legal practice-it has not been a failure. Clinical programs are
providing students with a more thoughtful, structured, and useful skills training than heretofore offered in law schools or in the
initial years of practice. In addition, many dedicated clinical
teachers provide greater insights into the ethics of lawyering and
the problems of manipulation through domination and deception than students will receive elsewhere. Many clinical pro50.
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grams expose their students to a demythologizing and critical
experience about how the legal system works for the people most
in need of society's protection. Students who take clinics find
the learning complementary to their other courses.
While customer satisfaction may warrant a future for clinical
programs, the growing constraints on law schools will likely require multiple justifications for relatively costly clinic programs.
Because curricular changes commonly serve faculty needs more
than student needs, Gee and Jackson found that, to survive, a
legal curricular change need only be minimally successful in
conveying ideas and skills to students. Other factors are equally
or more important. Educational innovations that survive in law
schools must be (1) less costly than alternatives, (2) easy to administer, (3) congruent with the overall structure of the institutions, (4) easily integrated into legal tradition and habits, and
(5) positively reinforcing for administrators, teachers, and "to
some extent, students who are involved in the program or
practice. " 111
Law school innovations that are costly, involve high levels of
time and energy to sustain, require substantial institutional adaptation, and are inconsistent with the current incentive system
of the law school will probably fail. Indeed, Gee and Jackson
used clinical legal education as their hypothetical case for likely
demise. They found costs of clinics high. Clinical teaching was
"exceptionally hard work." Absent full-time clinical semesters,
like medical schools, clinical courses did not integrate easily with
the rest of the curriculum. Clinical faculty recruitment, promotion, and tenure criteria did not easily fit the traditional in~titutional model. Clinicians "burned out" from their low status, "exhausted with their workload, with the absence of positive
reinforcements, and with their battles against deans and
faculty." 112
If clinics are to continue they must not only prove their worth
to law schools by making greater contributions in the training of
law students; they must also solve some of the structural
problems that isolate and remove clinical programs from the
mainstream of legal education.
Given the salary levels, status limitations, and working conditions of clinical fieldwork teachers, it is no surprise that the
brightest law graduates and lawyers have not been queuing up
for these positions. When these factors are added to the admin51. Gee & Jackson, supra note 4, at 969 (emphasis omitted).
52. Gee & Jackson, supra note 4, at 973.
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istrative and practical frustrations that come with the supervision of students in an active case load, fieldwork instruction is
difficult to sustain. This is particularly true if the clinic is operating under conditions of scarcity of staffing and resources. A
traditional classroom with its twenty hour teaching week is far
easier than a forty to fifty hour clinical teaching week. Clinical
fieldwork, even at a manageable student-supervisor ratio of tento-one, precludes the time for academic reading that is essential
to meet traditional university role expectations. Summers provide limited time for recovery, catch-up reading, and some research. If fund raising, proselytizing, and apologetics are also
necessary to defend and maintain an educational program having an uncertain institutional status, the reasons why clinical legal educators have not been able to live up to their rhetoric becomes clear.
Many of the problems of workload, incentives, status, and security can be solved by law schools. Law faculties, on present
funding, could maintain a limited clinical program for a limited
number of students. Such an effort would probably require more
than the three to five percent of their budgets that some law
schools currently devote to clinical programs. Faculties concerned about lower academic standards applied in hiring clinical
teachers could attract "more qualified" candidates by increasing
the priority given such appointments as well as the incentive
packages offered to the clinicians. If the clinical program structures required no more than one semester per year of fieldwork,
clinical teachers could teach traditional courses in alternate
semesters and receive traditional pay for a nine month academic
year. This would necessitate at least two permanent clinicians
for each sustained clinical course, but might attract more qualified lawyers. Additional supervisors would still need to be recruited on fixed period contracts.
Clinical programs cannot thrive on law school budgets and
limited grants. If they are to grow, the problem of funding must
be solved. The solution requires the help of the private bar. The
bar complains about the overly-theoretical nature of law schools.
They have supported the clinical movement, but solutions to the
funding problem require greater help. It is unrealistic to expect
law school funds to support legal services distributed without
charge through clinic programs. No medical school could maintain their clinical programs on such a premise.
The organized bar should support public funding for services
provided by law schools to the indigent. It should permit student practice in fee-producing cases or should collectively pro-
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vide some alternate funding source for clinical programs. The
American legal profession, one of the wealthiest occupational
classes in the world, 53 should assume some responsibility for
funding this aspect of the education and quality standards of its
ranks. The bar could also urge that those using the courts pay
for training of its future officers by a slight increase in filing or
motion fees.
Such funding for law school clinical and other professional development programs would provide the economic base for
schools to obtain qualified clinicians. More and more secure
funding would permit clinical faculty to make the teaching and
research contributions necessary for clinical studies to fulfill its
potential and justify a permanent place in the university law
school.
The organized bar could also relieve the substantive law demands on students and schools by limiting the number of subjects on the initial bar exam and providing follow-up examinations for practice in areas of specialization. Continuing legal
education programs could teach much of the substance that law
schools are attempting to cover. For many practitioners, learning
such subjects after graduation might upgrade the quality of the
teaching through recorded lectures by preeminent authorities.
Substantial changes in law school curricula occur slowly.
Clinical programs are likely to instigate only modest modifications. They have moved, in models and materials, beyond anecdotal ad hominems to the beginnings of a thoughtful and structured approach to professional training. While it might be
regretted that the Council on Legal Education for Professional
Responsibility did not provide more funding directed to development of materials and models rather than mere expansion of
numbers of programs, such mistakes cannot be undone. Although clinical courses have made advances in methods, materials, and messages, clinical studies must continue to grow in theory and structure to establish permanent roots in the academy.
Clinical programs need to develop more insightful explanations
about lawyering and legal institutions that can be generalized
and transferred to other settings to fulfill their promise. Developing theories, research models, and teaching methods in these
fields will be sufficient to warrant a legitimate place for clini53. Its fees each year have been estimated to be about $30 billion. Cutler, Conflicts of
Interest, 30 EMORY L.J. 1015, 1016 (1981). One tenth of one percent of this would be $30
million. If each of the nation's 500,000 lawyers were assessed an added $50 bar dues each
year, $25 million could be provided to law schools for clinical programs and public legal
service.
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cians in law schools.
It would be interesting to compare the progress made in the
fifteen years of clinical legal education with the progress of the
legal educational innovation begun 100 ·years earlier. If the
Langdellian case method were evaluated in 1885, it may not yet
have fulfilled its potential. It had its detractors among legal academics; it may have had a less welcome reception among the bar
and law students than has clinical legal education. The case
method fulfilled a law school need; it flourished and has today
generated hundreds of casebooks of substantial intellectual sophistication. If law schools provide a similar welcome to clinical
legal studies, I feel confident that the textbooks for clinics in
2085 will be respected by all fair-minded academics. 64
Although clinics have not fulfilled their potential nor lived up
to their aspirations, this failing is not unique to clinical education. Throughout their history, law schools have aspired to
achievements beyond their immediate reach. Even the most generous reading of alumni surveys shows that the goals of legal education outdistance its accomplishments. The criticism leveled
at clinical programs, that they have not developed a coherent
and critical theory for our legal system, and have not developed
adequate alternatives to the system of law and delivery of legal
services that have a better claim to distributive and procedural
justice, are criticisms that can be shared with law faculties
generally.
Given the recruiting patterns, the time demands, and the professional inclinations of most clinical teachers, even under the
better funded scenario, it is unrealistic to expect that clinical
teachers will generate the critical body of theoretical knowledge
needed to reform the legal and social order. Such knowledge is
more likely to come from a limited number of the traditional
academic faculty who can devote the time needed for such an
undertaking. Clinicians can play a supportive role. They can develop examples and counterexamples for critical theory. They
can provide useful contributions to joint empirical research activities. From their unique involvement with lawyers' behavior,
clinicians can add insights and normative suggestions on how
lawyers can and should act in various contexts. Clinicians can
interpret critical theory, giving it meaning in specific contexts,
and reinforcing its importance to students in fieldwork and case
seminars. Students will credit the utility of such theory if they
54. For an imaginative view into the future, see Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A Twenty-First-Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL Enuc. 612 (1984).
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find it discussed in and connected to the world of practice they
are entering.
Demands for greater practical and clinical involvement in law
schools surfaced in the days of Pound and Reed, they resurfaced
with Frank and Llewellyn,611 and have now reappeared. Today,
law schools have responded more fully than ever before. While
some legal academics would like to end this "trendish fad" and
return to "purer forms" of legal education, such regression
would be a mistake. It might satisfy faculty needs, but not the
needs of students, the bar, or society. It would not end the complaints about the fundamental flaws of legal education.
Law schools should not use growing student careerism and diminishing law school resources as the occasion for ending clinical
legal education or reducing it to simulations that introduce more
artificiality to law school. Faculties deceive themselves if they
think that students weaned from clinics will return with renewed devotion to law school classes and seek added offerings in
psychology, history, philosophy, and economics. Many law stu- dents want to learn how to be lawyers. Instead of delaying and
frustrating this desire, law schools should utilize the student motivation attached to it. If done carefully, clinical work can provide the educational vehicle to teach a broader and more humanistic view of legal practice and professionalism. Leaders in
legal education need to work with leaders in the bar to capture
the learning and successes of the last fifteen years of clinical legal education and build on its future potential to address and
resolve a problem of mutual interest.

55.

Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL Eouc. 211 (1948).

